IV Egoical and hyletic temporality in genetic consideration

No. 14

My stream of mental processes and I

§ 1. <The reduction to the primal, egoless sensuality’s temporality>

If I consider all mine, all that is really given to me in the widest sense (I wish to forget about some me-myself now), in phenomenological reduction to the stream of consciousness, then I find my “stream of mental processes”. More precisely, I find a “vivid” “present”, necessarily mobile in this vividness, i.e. mine, subjective present, with its structure of primal present and “horizon” of the just-now-beenness and of some future. I may advance into this horizon and [I] apprehend a continuity of such subjective presents in “evidence”, of an endless continuity of the past and an undetermined “coming” continuity, lying in preview though. If I pay attention to the points of primal present, then they form a streaming continuum of a solid form, the form of the immanent time. If I at the same time pay attention to the continuity of complete present times, then I find, that to every point of the immanent time (or rather, to every primal present belonging to it, and in which temporal form is objectivated (identifiable in repeated reproductions) belongs a complete present objectivated as well, only according to its point of primal present lying within the immanent time of those primal present times. But at the same time the horizon surrounding the point of primal present respectively “relates” to a stretch of the immanent time: intentionally.

But if we consider this continuity of vivid present times (one, <as> the momentary, and unsustainable as a current one, all others <as> those that have been), then they also form, as I have already said, an “objective”, an ever again identifiable content, and again we need to say: Taken in this identity – every <present> was something identical [275] intentionally presenting itself in a multitude of “pasts” – they are in a solid immanent time form, that needs to be distinguished first from the temporal form we brought out before, but in “coincidence” with it. We’ve already seen it thus: since every point of primal present determines a point of the time of primal present in every complete present, and [since] on the other hand [it] is the focal point of a horizon undistinguishable from it, and in one with this horizon again only determines a point, a point of full present time.

We have again the problem of the endless regress here (compare the, if I remember correctly, former presentations of a different kind). Is not every complete present, if I look at it, the center of a horizon, and only by my advancing into it do I have the consequence of the pasts of former complete present times.

I will not go into detail here. In any case we have multiple immanent time orders, one among them necessarily the first, the form of something temporally being, not implying anything of that intentionality within its content of being, with the help of which temporal being is constituted as a temporal one.

We gain another, necessarily first one, if we also take into account other ways of intentional constitution, of course also accompanied by time constitution: immanent time position of sensational data – an immanent row of time of the proceeding aspects – row of time of phantom change – row of time of the thing; that is, the first, most radical emotional order in the double sense.

We have performed the phenomenological reduction in the direction situated by me. We thereby exclude “world”.

1. We want to now perform consciously some kind of reduction, which we have already performed up till now, but without any distinct nomination: the reduction to the “primal sensuality”. Namely, if we gain the realm of pure subjectivity through phenomenological reduction, then it may be shown that we need to differ something double. The reduction we mean and which results in an apriori necessary structure for us, is the abstraction of one Ego and all egoical – certainly mere abstraction, but an important one. Then we have sensational data in the first immanent time order and sensual [276] emotions. Sensual drives are affections towards the Ego, and a passive being attracted of the Ego, likewise “sensual” realizations, “actions of drive” are passive reactions, but passive, nothing comes from the Ego there, springing from it itself as an *actus*. This is thus the sphere of the “stimuli” and reactions on stimuli: irritability. But we want to switch off those <as well>, since it makes the Ego be part of the game. Namely, we distinguish the “completely egoless” sensual tendencies from this field: sensual tendencies of association and reproduction, thereby determined formations of horizon. <It is the> question, how is the case with the primal time consciousness already. Passive intentionality. The Ego is as a pole of affections and reactions thought of as being out of the game, or rather, abstracted from it, We then have thus a first structure to be distinguished “abstractively”, that of the primal sensuality’s passivity.
2. We then take the Ego into account and the polarization of the Ego. That is, this results as a first new thing in irritability, the realm of affections and reactions, of course presupposing the first step.
3. And then as a third step (presupposing the former ones) the realm of the *intellectus agens*. But again we need to differ first: The participations of the Ego as participations of the awake Ego are different. “Attention”. The Ego is attentive, it is awake especially for something, directed towards it, directed as an Ego pole towards an intentional pole, a counter-pole, object, in different ways, apprehending, feeling, desiring, willing.

Here we need a theory of attention, of being awake, and of separating the step of passivity in the wakefulness, of giving in to; on the other hand of the being spontaneous in the pregnant sense, of the performance of specific Ego acts. Thus new layers enter the stream of mental processes, or we take into account new layers of it through considerating the Ego pole, which of course have again an immanent time order, the mental processes of the Ego, that are nothing separate from egoless considered ones (under reserve, if we take special investigations for certain spheres to be necessary here), but mean new structures, although they certainly also show modes of the change of the old [structures][277]. Because there are functional changes through dependence here.[[1]](#footnote-1)

§ 2. <The identical, not objective being and the untemporal Ego as a functioning pole (primal stand) of the stream of mental processes>

In this way we have tried to construct for us the universal realm of the immanent time or of the immanent “coinciding” time orders. Obviously we thereby have every subjective – and in a certain way we do “have” it – and yet again not; because that which we have is simply something being, temporal, and not all subjective is something temporal, is something individual in the sense of the individualized through a single point in time. That, which we most of all do not have in the stream of mental processes, is the Ego itself, the identical center, the pole, the one the whole content of the stream of mental processes is related to, the Ego being affected by this or that content, then actively comporting towards this content in this and that way, and creating it actively in this and that way. Certainly, we have spoken of all that, and we have found a place for that in the stream of mental processes (in its coinciding and penetrating streams). But we need to explain here, that the Ego as an identical pole for all mental processes and for all that, which is itself ontically determined in the intentionality of mental processes themselves (e.g. the meant nature as being meant) is the pole for all time rows and necessarily timeless as that, the Ego, for which time is constituted, for which temporality, individually singular objectivity in the intentionality of the sphere of mental processes, is there, but which is not temporal itself. It is in this sense thus not something “being”, but a counterpart for all being, not an object, but a primal stand for all objectivity. The Ego [278] should properly not be called the Ego, and should not be named at all, since it has then become objective. It is the nameless above all apprehensible, <the> not standing above all, not hovering, not being, but “functioning”, as apprehending, as judging, etc.[[2]](#footnote-2)

And do we not have to say: Its experiencing a stimulus, reacting-to-stimuli is, properly speaking, insofar as we take the Ego as the functioning one, nothing temporal either, and even more so not its taking a position, its behaving-actively, as long as it is as behavior within the Ego or from the Ego? But by the Ego’s functioning and actively paying attention to <the> constituted, directs itself, takes part in it, a temporal content necessarily accrues to it, a “noematic one” or else like a subjective content, an ever new one, a temporally changing or relatively persisting one.[[3]](#footnote-3) And this content, as having come from <the> Ego’s function, shows to the reflection the direction towards the functioning Ego, which now simply becomes an objective one in the reflection as an identical center of function, as the performing one for all these performances. But how can something become objective, which is not an object, how can that become apprehendable, which is untemporal, overtemporal and still may only be found as something temporal in the apprehending? Well, it is given essentially that simply such a thing emerges in the stream of consciousness, and ever again may emerge, which has a completely different becoming as another thing as a mental process, a becoming, which is not only given as a “Something happens”, and may be reproductively repeated ever again, but is given as “I am doing something”, “I am suffering of something”. Or rather prior to that: <Something> is given with an irritating character (stimulus, an irritating whistle) of the “formation”, of the performance, and that this now points back to a correlate, something being there as well, lying in a new dimension, simply the “I am doing this”, “I am performing the performance”, and there we meet a pole, something identical, which is not temporal itself.

[279] We have compared this Ego pole and still contrasted with the manifold “poles of an object”, the intentional unities. Every object is “constituted” as a unity of consciousness’ manifoldness of it. This talking of consciousness is ambiguous. If we take into view the “intentional mental processes”, “encompassing” the respective object as their intentional unity by changing in their immanent time. We find there for example an alleged object as the same one in a continuous row of perception, like a constantly seen, red, square plane given in a row of perspective adumbrations. And if it is no longer seen, it may be the same, still “emptily” intended. Is the alleged there really part of this row and [in] each of its phases? (Yes, one will answer, as something intentional, as something alleged. And if we exclusively look at that, then we have a temporal continuity of the alleged as such (the *esse* of which lies within the *percipi*). It was, as it seems to me suddenly, not right, to have spoken repeatedly as if the “noema” was not really lying within the mental process.) (Which by the way we may not well call a noesis either.) The intentional, but also the intending mental process is a temporal object here, this [is] thus again a “pole” itself, and all these poles lie in coinciding time rows, and all these time rows in their unity of coincidence make up the whole mental living, the stream of mental processes.

If we now think of the Ego in action and add the Ego’s actions themselves as mental processes? The Ego is affected by a time stream so to say already present, and it turns towards it contents, busies itself with them, and now the advertance is an activity, performance constituted in the activity itself a mental process again.

But now we find in the mental processes sprung from the Ego the central point as a new time layer superimposed on it, the point, in which everything is currently centered <in> this layer, the identical Ego. It is something identical for all time points, for all time objects, having entered a relation to the Ego, or towards which it has “comported” from itself. And as I said above: It is at first something identical in the ways of behavior, in the ways of relation facing us as mental processes themselves, and which [280] may afterwards enter into a relation to the Ego itself as well. All objects can do that, and the Ego is called their center of relation, insofar as exactly this evidence of the “I can” exists, also for objects, that have not entered into a relation to the Ego.

I have separate mental processes in the form of the *cogito* (like the converse mental process of affection to the Ego) in the one order of being of the “stream of consciousness”, stream of mental processes, with its parallel, coinciding time rows. We perform reproductions, and we say in the transition, [that] the reproduced, representiated mental processes are separate, their Ego is identically the same. And yet, every mental process being conscious there in presentiation, shows itself as a (past) “I think”. The Ego is a “standing and lasting” Ego, it is not becoming and vanishing like a mental process. It is not something temporally extended, thus something else in every time phase, and only the same as something changing, or in different momentary situations as such being ever again different ones and at the most equal, something identical in the continuity. It is identical as well in the discontinuity. But there we could say, the stream of mental process is continuous, and even [there], where the Ego does not enter into some special affection or even into action, it is still constantly there, inseparable from the stream of mental processes and only necessarily continuously lasting through it. But that which lasts has a new content in every phase of the duration, but the Ego does not have any content in the time at all, nothing different and nothing equal, nothing “intuitive”, perceptible, experienceable. Only the affections, only the acts having entered time, have their contents and have their durations, and in every phase of the duration a phase of their content. Every act has the act pole, the Ego, which is not only numerically identical, but [which] for all time points of the time, being there for it, <and> for the mental processes being its temporal contents, <has> the same absolutely identical sense Ego, something identical of the form, in a certain sense something ideally identical, which is ever again temporally “localized” according to its acts, its situations, and still is not temporal actually.

1. We also needed to explicitly speak of the ontic as something meant here and of the „immanent“ time of this meant ontic as such, which thus is something subjective itself, and results in an ontic-subjective time, coinciding with the time of the sensational data, that of the ways of appearance, etc.

   Of course we thereby have in view not the time of true nature, that is, the „true“ ont<ic> time with its richness, but, e.g. if some continuity of perceptions of nature takes place, of the perceived nature, the perceived objectivity as such, as „meant“ and belonging to it like the perceived space, the perceived figure, thus the perceived time and shape of the time. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. „Something being“ as something individually being, bound to <a> point in time, and individualized through it. The Ego <is> thus not „being“ yet. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. All this needs tillto be considered many times. It is almost bordering at possible description. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)